

Mark Scheme (Results)

Summer 2019

Pearson Edexcel GCE History (9HI0/2D)
Advanced

Paper 2: Depth study

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy,
c1830–70

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany,
c1840–71

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General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

Generic Level Descriptors: Section A

Target: AO2: Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within its historical context.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates surface level comprehension of the source material without analysis, selecting some material relevant to the question, but in the form of direct quotations or paraphrases. • Some relevant contextual knowledge is included, with limited linkage to the source material. • Evaluation of the source material is assertive with little or no supporting evidence. Concepts of reliability or utility may be addressed, but by making stereotypical judgements.
2	4–7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the source material by selecting and summarising information and making undeveloped inferences relevant to the question. • Contextual knowledge is added to information from the source material to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry but with limited support for judgement. Concepts of reliability or utility are addressed mainly by noting aspects of source provenance and judgements may be based on questionable assumptions.
3	8–12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates understanding of the source material and shows some analysis by selecting key points relevant to the question, explaining their meaning and selecting material to support valid inferences. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to explain or support inferences as well as to expand, confirm or challenge matters of detail. • Evaluation of the source material is related to the specified enquiry and explanation of utility takes into account relevant considerations such as nature or purpose of the source material or the position of the author. Judgements are based on valid criteria but with limited justification.
4	13–16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analyses the source material, interrogating the evidence to make reasoned inferences and to show a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion, although treatment of the two sources may be uneven. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying some understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and applied, although some of the evaluation may be weakly substantiated. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement.
5	17–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interrogates the evidence of both sources with confidence and discrimination, making reasoned inferences and showing a range of ways the material can be used, for example by distinguishing between information and claim or opinion. • Deploys knowledge of the historical context to illuminate and/ or discuss the limitations of what can be gained from the content of the source material, displaying secure understanding of the need to interpret source material in the context of the values and concerns of the society from which it is drawn. • Evaluation of the source material uses valid criteria which are justified and fully applied. Evaluation takes into account the weight the evidence will bear as part of coming to a judgement and, where appropriate, distinguishes between the degree of certainty with which aspects of it can be used as the basis for claims.

Section B

Target: AO1: Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material.
1	1–3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	4–7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is limited analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited substantiation and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	8–12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence and precision.
4	13–16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period, although treatment of issues may be uneven. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence and precision.
5	17–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: Indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70

Question	Indicative content
1	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on the nature of Piedmont's annexation of the central Italian state of Tuscany.</p> <p>Source 1</p> <p>1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In May 1859, Cavour, as the Prime Minister of Piedmont, was an influential individual in the events happening in northern and central Italy• It is a confidential message in which Cavour is clearly able to give a candid account of his intentions for Piedmont to annex Tuscany and the methods he thought should be used• The purpose of the message is to encourage Boncompagni to take action on behalf of Piedmont that would result in the annexation of Tuscany. <p>2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the nature of Piedmont's annexation of the central Italian state of Tuscany:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• It suggests that Cavour hoped to take advantage of the impact of the Second War of Italian Independence on central Italy ('preferable to republicanism...a ruler from Napoleon's family.')• It claims that there would be little external or internal opposition to annexation ('Neither in Europe as whole, nor in Tuscany itself, should we encounter any serious obstacle')• It provides evidence that Cavour intended to manipulate popular support for annexation ('to prepare and direct opinion towards fusion with Piedmont.'). <p>3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Piedmont took similar steps towards annexation in Parma and Modena and Piedmont attempted a similar strategy in the Papal States• Despite the support of the British, there was widespread uncertainty with regard to Piedmont's activities in central Italy both in Europe and Italy• The armistice at Villafranca, and the subsequent resignation of Cavour in July 1859, put the formal annexation of the central Italian states on hold until Cavour's return to office in 1860• In March 1860 plebiscites were held in the central Italian states of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna; voting in all the states was overwhelmingly in favour of annexation but with an undercurrent of manipulation. <p>Source 2</p> <p>1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• As a diplomatic memorandum it could have been written as a

Question	Indicative content
	<p>candid/objective account of the events in Tuscany in April–June 1859</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The language of the memorandum might suggest that the French ambassador was attempting to undermine the legitimacy of the Tuscan support for annexation ('intense pressure'; 'unscrupulous manipulator') • The memorandum was sent after the end of the war with Austria, and Cavour's resignation, and so may have been trying to put Piedmont in a bad light. <p>2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the nature of Piedmont's annexation of the central Italian state of Tuscany:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It implies that Piedmont used the arrival of armed troops under Napoleon III to spread insecurity in Tuscany ('showed their usual calm and mildness until') • It claims that a Tuscan minister suggested that Napoleon III supported the annexation ('this was also the Emperor Napoleon's wish') • It claims that the Tuscan population was intimidated by the supporters of annexation ('mercy of the nationalist societies'; 'I saw some strange changes of mind') • It provides evidence that local councils voted for annexation under duress ('Several councils resigned...in protest against intense pressure'). <p>3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Piedmont took advantage of the outbreak of the war with Austria (1859) to occupy parts of central Italy • Moderate revolutions broke out in the central Italian states in spring 1859 in reaction to the outbreak of the Second Italian War of Independence • Napoleon III did not approve of Piedmontese annexation of the central Italian states; the Pact of Plombières (1858), and the armistice/peace settlement of 1859, attempted to prevent this • In 1859 unsuccessful attempts were made to restore the Duchy of Tuscany. <p>Sources 1 and 2</p> <p>The following points could be made about the sources in combination:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The events described in Source 2 appear to corroborate the strategy for annexation suggested by Cavour in Source 1 • Both Sources can be used as evidence of Cavour's determination to use the threat of French control as a means to gain support for annexation • Despite the potential for exaggeration in Source 2, both sources provide evidence of the methods used by the supporters of annexation to manipulate popular support.

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
2	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates must analyse and evaluate the sources to consider how far the historian could make use of them to shed light on the reasons for the outbreak of revolution in the German states in 1848.</p> <p>Source 3</p> <p>1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The purpose of the speech was to explain the reasons why workers in German states had become involved in discontent• As an aristocrat with no apparent connection to the industrial developments he is describing, Prince Lichnowsky's viewpoint might be seen as objective• As a member of the ruling classes, Prince Lichnowsky might be trying to play down the role of radical political ideas in the growing discontent in Germany; 1847 was a year of growing political tension. <p>2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the outbreak of revolution in the German states in 1848:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• It provides evidence that problems in the industrial sector were causing hardship for the working-classes in the German states ('Heartless manufacturers oppressed the poor workers')• It claims that hunger and not political ideas was the root cause of discontent ('I believe...the result of hunger, not socialist ideas.')• It suggests that the economic crisis being described might have led to some middle-class businessmen having reason to be discontented ('factories were forced to shut down...bankruptcy')• It suggests by its dismissal of any political cause of working-class discontent ('none...paid any attention to revolutionary agitation.') that political ideas were actually a source of tension in the German states. <p>3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the years 1846–47, problems in manufacturing industry led to an intense economic crisis, which was exacerbated by harvest failures that created severe social distress as food prices rose and availability declined• From 1844, when many Silesian weavers revolted against their employers, Silesia was at the forefront of working-class discontent in Germany• The United Diet became a forum for political discussion and debate on the problems facing Prussia in 1847 before Frederick William IV closed it down• The revolutions took place in 1848 at a time when the economic and social problems facing the German states were beginning to improve.

Question	Indicative content
	<p>Source 4</p> <p>1. The following points could be made about the origin and nature of the source and applied when evaluating the use of selected information and inferences:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As a political programme, it outlines not only the democrats' constitutional hopes for the future but also indicates the reasons for political discontent the year before the outbreak of revolutions across Germany • It was produced by radical democrats based in South-West Germany and so may only be representative of the more extreme proponents of political reform and/or from a specific region of Germany • It was produced in September 1847 at the beginning of the constitutional crisis in Baden. <p>2. The evidence could be assessed here in terms of giving weight to the following points of information and inferences about the reasons for the outbreak of revolution in the German states in 1848:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It suggests that many in Germany were dissatisfied with the present political situation ('Decrees that damage our basic rights') • It provides evidence of the desire to be free from repression ('The police must cease to degrade and harass'; 'The right...to free speech should be recognised.') • It provides evidence of a belief in German nationalism ('a guarantee of our existence as a nation.') • It implies that socio-economic problems were present in the German states ('fair system of taxation'; 'imbalance between workers and business'). <p>3. Knowledge of historical context should be deployed to support and develop inferences and to confirm the accuracy/usefulness of information or to note limitations or to challenge aspects of content. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Austria, through the Metternich System, and Prussia had imposed a repressive system of control across the German Confederation for decades • German nationalism was a key feature of the 1848 revolutions, e.g. the creation of a national assembly in Frankfurt • The desire for moderate constitutional liberal reform was a key feature of the 1848 revolutions rather than radical liberal or socialist reform • Baden was a centre of radical politics in Germany; the September constitutional crisis was seen as the forerunner of events in 1848 and the revolution in March 1848 attempted to create a republic. <p>Sources 3 and 4</p> <p>The following points could be made about the sources in combination:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • They provide evidence of a range of possible underlying causes for the outbreak of revolution including economic and social distress (Source 3) and political discontent (Source 4) • Both Sources provide evidence for radical political influences in the German states • Both Sources refer to the inequalities between workers and business as a cause of discontent in the German states • Source 4 could be used as evidence to counter Source 3's view that political ideas were not an influential cause of discontent.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 2D.1: The unification of Italy, c1830–70

Question	Indicative content
3	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that the main reason for the failure of both the 1830–32 and 1848–49 revolutions in Italy was a lack of popular support.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the main reason for the failure of both the 1830–32 and 1848–49 revolutions in Italy was a lack of popular support should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Revolutionary opposition groups, forced by repressive policies to organise in secret, failed to establish enough popular support before the outbreaks to sustain the revolutionary momentum• Middle-class revolutionary leaders failed to harness the potential of the 'ordinary' people; the fear of popular radicalism and revolution 'from below' undermined the 1830–31 revolutions• The labouring classes, particularly the peasantry, often failed to support the revolutions due to suspicion of the liberal middle-classes and in some cases welcomed back traditional rulers, e.g. the Papal States• Although Italian nationalism championed unity it failed to inspire the mass support required to challenge the restored order in Italy, e.g. Mazzini's Young Italy movement failed to inspire much of the peasantry in 1848–49• During the 1848–49 revolutions, the Papal Allocution subverted Charles Albert's attempt to harness popular nationalism in the First Italian War of Independence. <p>Arguments and evidence that there were other reasons for the failure of the 1830–32 and 1848–49 revolutions in Italy should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Most of the revolutionary outbreaks were localised with local aims, e.g. Modena refused help to the Papal States 1830–32, Mazzinian revolutions 1848–48• As a result of the spontaneous outbreak of revolution in both 1830 and 1848, the revolutionaries were often disorganised, ill-prepared and generally ill-equipped• A lack of foreign support, e.g. failure of the French to support the 1830–32 revolutions and their active support for the return of the Papacy in 1848• The use of military force in support of the traditional rulers by Austria, e.g. implementation of the Troppau Protocol 1830–32 and the Radetzky campaign 1848–49• Many of 1848–49 revolutions did have an element of popular support, e.g. peasant support for Sicilian independence, growing enthusiasm for Charles Albert in Piedmont, support for Mazzini in Rome and Manin in Venice. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
4	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that, in the years 1848–67, Garibaldi was more often a failure than a success in his attempts to unify Italy.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1848–67, Garibaldi was more often a failure than a success in his attempts to unify Italy should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Garibaldi's participation in the attempt to create a Roman Republic in 1848 resulted in failure; as commander of the garrison Garibaldi was unable to hold out against the French • Garibaldi spent much of the 1850s in exile and although he was a popular and romantic figure within Italy had limited success in gaining active support • The expedition to Sicily (1859) attracted just over 1,000 volunteers; Garibaldi found himself fighting for the independence of Sicily with peasants who had little understanding of his concept of 'Italia' • In 1860 the march on Rome failed and the meeting at Teano (1860) led to a constitutional monarchy under the supremacy of Piedmont rather than the unified Italian republic Garibaldi would have preferred • Garibaldi failed to take Rome from the Kingdom of Italy in both 1862 (defeated by Piedmontese forces) and 1867 (defeated by French forces). <p>Arguments and evidence that counter the suggestion that, in the years 1848–67, Garibaldi was more often a failure than a success in his attempts to unify Italy should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Throughout the period Garibaldi remained a potent symbol of Italian nationalism and unification • Garibaldi's selfless defence of Rome against the French in 1849 brought him legendary status and helped to encourage Italian nationalism and the concept of '<i>Italia fara da se</i>' • Garibaldi's guerrilla activity during the Second Italian War of Independence (1859) was one of the few successful 'Italian' military contributions to the war • The success of Garibaldi's invasion and conquest of Sicily led to the rapid capitulation of Naples and take-over of the south • It was Garibaldi who 'handed' over the south to Victor Emmanuel II at Teano and so 'unified' Italy. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Option 2D.2: The unification of Germany, c1840–71

Question	Indicative content
5	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the suggestion that, from 1850 until its defeat in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, Austria maintained a dominant position over the German states.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that, from 1850 until its defeat in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, Austria maintained a dominant position over the German states should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The 'capitulation of Olmütz/Olomouc' reasserted the Austrian position within Germany after the upheavals of the years 1848–50• The German Confederation was re-established in May 1851 with the acknowledgement of Austria's political leadership and senior position within the duality of power• The majority of the German states continued to accept Austria as the predominant power and the Austrian Emperor as the legitimate spokesman for Germany throughout the period• Prussia was not in a strong enough position to directly confront Austria militarily until 1866 and, at the beginning of the war, on paper Austria had the stronger military force• Most German rulers, even under considerable pressure from Prussia, chose to fight on the side of Austria at the outbreak of war in 1866. <p>Arguments and evidence that, from 1850 until its defeat in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, Austria did not maintain a dominant position over the German states should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Olmütz/Olomouc merely restored the pre-1848 balance of power in Germany between Austria and Prussia; Austria's presidency of the German Confederation and Prussia's leadership of the <i>Zollverein</i>• Early attempts by Austria to expand the German Confederation by including its eastern territories and to create a Mitteleuropa economic union were resisted by the other German states• Attempts by Austria to undermine the <i>Zollverein</i> were resisted throughout the period and Prussia remained the dominant force in trade relationship between the German states• In the years 1862–65, Prussia increasingly challenged Austrian dominance in the political sphere, e.g. Austrian-Prussian diplomacy over Schleswig-Holstein, William I's refusal to attend the Assembly of Princes (1863)• By 1866, Prussia had positioned itself as a viable alternative to Austria for the leadership of Germany – economically, politically and militarily. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
6	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement about the statement that, in the years 1862–71, Bismarck was the master-planner of German unification.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1862–71, Bismarck was the master-planner of German unification should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bismarck's 'iron and blood' speech (September 1862) suggested that Bismarck had a 'design' for fulfilling greater German unity through Prussian influence • Bismarck is believed to have told Disraeli (1862) that it was his intention to go to war with Austria, end the German Confederation and create a <i>Kleinsdeutschland</i> solution • 'Bismarckian diplomacy' created foreign relationships advantageous to Prussia, e.g. Russian neutrality (1863–66), French goodwill (1865), Austrian (1866) and French isolation (1870) • Bismarck engineered three major wars in order to achieve Prussian dominance in Germany – war with Denmark (1864), war with Austria (1866), war with France (1870). <p>Arguments and evidence that, in the years 1862–71, Bismarck was not the master-planner of German unification, should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bismarck was an opportunist taking advantage of situations as they arose, e.g. Polish Revolt (1863), rapidity of the Austrian defeat (1866), vacancy for the Spanish throne (1868) • Bismarck was merely taking advantage of underlying factors that made Prussian dominance over Germany inevitable in the long-term, e.g. Prussian economic growth, the <i>Zollverein</i>, the decline of Austria • Unification came about because of Prussian victories on the battlefield engineered by von Moltke and von Roon; the military viewed Bismarck's interference as a liability in the final stages of the war with France (1870) • Bismarck was fortunate to be operating in a favourable international situation in which major powers, such as Britain and Russia, did not consider Prussia a threat to the European balance of power • In 1870 it was French diplomatic blunderings on the part of the Empress Eugenie and Gramont which provoked the crisis that led to the Franco-Prussian war. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>